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This change would effect an insurance of all the interests in the property in
the case of ambiguity; though practically it would mean only that liability to
third parties must be denied in clear language. Insurance companies would be in
the same relative position they are in now. Presently justifiable lay expectations
would be checked and the broader change to insurance of all the interests in the
property would be properly postponed until it can be fully justified on the basis
of more extensive studies into the practical context in which these rules of fire
insurance law operate.
TEE NONCUMULATIVE CLAUSE AND RENEWED FIDELITY
BONDS-PIG IN A POKE?
In Columbia Hospitalfor Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,r defendant
surety company issued a fidelity bond indemnifying the plaintiff against defal-
cations by certain named employees, with a maximum indemnity of $5,ooo in
the case of plaintiff's bookkeeper. Renewal was effected by subsequent issu-
ance of a Blanket Position Bond' affording slightly broader coverage. The sec-
ond bond had no definite date of termination, but was renewable on payment of
annual premiums, subject to the proviso that the payment of such premiums
"shall not render the amount of this bond cumulative from year to year."
Four years after the original bond was issued, a rider was attached, "extending
the term for three years from the renewal date" and respectively substituting
the terms "periods," "premium period" and "agreed premiums" for the words
"years," "premium year" and "annual premiums" wherever they occurred in
the Blanket Position Bond. Three years later, plaintiff discovered that its book-
keeper had embezzled in excess of $4o,ooo over a four year period, $5,498.32
during the year before the rider went into effect, and $3,975.47, $13,28i.45 and
$17,555.9 o respectively during the three years covered by the bond and rider.
The insured accordingly filed a claim for $18,975.47 on the theory that the fidel-
ity company's liability was $5,000 for each year of coverage. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia affirmed the grant of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, limiting recovery to $5,000.
No authoritative survey has ever been conducted to determine what was an
important question in the principal case, what employers really think they
x i88 F. 2d 654 (App. D.C., 195).
2 Fidelity bonds can be made out to cover either specifically named employees, or the occu-
pants of designated positions for the time being. The companies have fashioned many different
kinds of bonds, containing various combinations of these two basic features. Among the most
widely used are the Name Schedule or Fidelity Schedule bonds, covering named employees,
with or without indications of position; Position Schedules, bonding the positions listed re-
gardless of which employees occupy them or how often the personnel shifts; and Blanket
Position Bonds, covering all employees of the insured employer for the same amount, regard-
less of position or name. Riegel and Miller, Insurance Principles and Practices 694, 698-703
(3d. ed., 1947).
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"lacquire" in the way of added indemnity upon renewal of fidelity bonds.3 Fre-
quent litigation indicates that a significant number of them feel that the
renewal premiums purchase "new" coverage during the renewal period up to
the stated amount of the indemnity.4 Coverage for the old period presumably
has already been paid for in full and continues together with the renewal indem-
nity.S Viewed in this light, an annually renewed fidelity bond would give cover-
age up to the face amount for each year, with a possible total liability of twice
the stated amount or more, depending on the number of renewals,' and contrary
to the result in the Columbia Hospital case.
Whether or not the expectations of employer-obligees on this matter have
been correctly stated, no such coverage is offered anywhere in the field of private
fidelity or guaranty insurance today.7 The actual terms of fidelity bonds vary
3 Fidelity insurance has been well defined as an agreement whereby one indemnifies
another "against loss arising from the want of honesty, integrity, or fidelity of employees or
others holding positions of trust.. . ." John Church Co. v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 13 Ga. App.
826, 837, 8o S.E. 7093, 1095 (7909). In general, principles of insurance law govern the treat-
ment of fidelity bonds and contracts. Ibid. See Vance, Handbook of the Law of Insurance 919
(2d ed., 1930). On the question of what is accomplished by the renewal of fidelity bonds, con-
sider the following: The controlling question is "whether the renewal create[s] a new contract
or not." Fellows, J., dissenting in Michigan Mortgage Investment Co., 244 Mich. 72, 75, 227
N.W. 140, 141 (1928). "The question here is, What did the [employer] buy the first year, what
did he buy the second year, and what did he buy the third year?" Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. State Bank, z3 F. 2d 474, 476 (E.D. Ill., 1926).
Serious questions arise as to the applicability of contract law to the insurance field. Since the
insured often knows little of the real nature of the insurance contract and quite as often
fails to read its provisions, it has been suggested that insurance law should be considered sui
generis. Schultz, The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract, x5 Law & Contemp. Prob.
376, 389 (1950); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Con-
tract, 43 Col. L. Rev. 629 (7943); Vance, supra, at 689-69o.
4 United States v. American Surety Co. of New York, 772 F. 2d 735 (C.A. 2d, 7949), cert.
denied 337 U.S. 930 (i95o); Hack v. American Surety Co. of New York, 96 F. 2d 9 3 9 (C.A. 7 th,
7938); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. State Bank, 13 F. 2d 474 (E.D. Ill., 7926); Maryland
Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Montgomery, 246 Fed. 892 (C.A. 5 th, 7917); Michigan
Mortgage Investment Co. v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 244 Mich. 72, 221 N.W. 740
(1928), noted in 27 Mich. L. Rev. 442 (1929). For an excellent compilation of many cases
illustrating this point, see Extent of Liability on Fidelity Bond Renewed from Year to Year,
7 A.L.R. 2d 946 (1949).
s Fidelity coverage is distinctive in that actual knowledge of a defalcation may not reach
the insured party until several years after its occurrence. Analogies drawn to fire and life
insurance, therefore, fail to illumine the issues raised in this field. Both life and fire insurance
policies give protection against single, easily discoverable calamities. Premiums will not be
paid after the calamity occurs. Aetna Casualty &Surety Co. v. State Bank, 73 F. 2d 474 (E.D.
Ill., 1926). See Fidelity Bonds-Does ItPay to RenewThem?, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 442 (x929); In-
surance-Fidelity Bonds-Renewals As Affecting the Liability of the Surety, 25 N.C.L. Rev.
347 (7947); Fidelity Bonds-Extent of Coverage-Cumulative or Non-Cumulative, 20 So.
Calif. L. Rev. 226 (1947). But cf. Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 8o F. 2d 205
(C.A. 4 th, 3935)-
6 And the changes, if any, in the face amount of the bond from year to year.
7 Some governmental agencies, however, do receive such protection. United States v.
American Surety Co. of New York, 772 F. 2d 735 (C.A. 2d, 7949). The Bureau of Internal
Revenue employs the device of bonding its investigators with different companies each year.
In general, recovery up to the face amounts on these bonds can be had only for defalcations
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greatly and on these different provisions the courts have based their decisions as
to the nature and extent of the particular coverage afforded.' If, for example, the
original bond has a definite date of termination, a renewal may be interpreted
as a separate and distinct contract. 9 Coverage under such an interpretation ex-
tends to the face amount of the bond for each year, but is usually limited by a
"time for discovery" clause and the restriction that liability for any one period
cannot be carried over to another1o But in general, and especially if there is no
set date for termination, the issuance and acceptance of renewal certificates or
more informal tokens of renewal is considered a continuance of the coverage.,
Fidelity companies now include cumulative liability limitation clauses like
those in the principal case in practically every standard bond. They thereby
seek to avoid the consequences of interpretations of bonds and renewals as sepa-
rate contracts. The following provisions are typical:
The liability of the Underwriter under the bond (and under the renewal instru-
ment) shall, in no event, exceed in the aggregate the amount carried under the bond.
occurring during the particular year covered, provided that the defalcations be discovered
within two years after the terminations of the bond. Thus, there is complete yearly coverage
under this scheme for a period up to three years. Communication from Aetna Insurance and
Casualty Co., June 18, i95i. It has been observed that adoption of this practice by private
parties would be contrary to the best interests of both the surety companies and the insured.
27 Mich. L. Rev. 442 (1929).
8 In so doing few courts indulge in the notion that fidelity bonds should be governed by
the principles of objective contract law. (Strictissimi juris). Guaranty Co. v. Pressed Brick Co.,
191 U.S. 416, 424 (1903). But cf. Crane, Breed & Breed v. The City Ins. Co., 3 Fed. 558, 56o-
6i (S.D. Ohio, i88o). A court will always demand that the terms of the contract be free
from "ambiguity" in conformity with generally accepted standards of insurance law. American
Surety Co. v. Pauly, i7o U.S. 133, 144 (1898); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Swedish
Methodist Ass'n, 92 F. 2d 649, 652 (C. A. 7th, 1937).
9 United States v. American Surety Co., X72 F. 2d 135 (C.A. 2d, 1949); Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co. v. State Bank, 13 F. 2d 474, (E.D. Ill., 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 19 F. 2d 969
(C.A. 7th, 1927); Maryland Casualty Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 Fed. 892 (C.A. 5th, 1917);
Florida Cent. & P.R. Co. v. American Surety Co., 99 Fed. 674 (C.A. 2d, igoo); Hood v.
Simpson, 206 N.C. 748, 175 S.E. 193 (i934); Ladies of Modem Maccabbees v. Illinois Surety
Co., 196 Mich. 27, 363 N.W. 7 (1917); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Williams, 96 Miss. io,
49 So. 742 (igog); De Jernette v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 98 Ky. 558, 33 S.W. 828 (1896).
loStandard Accident Ins. Co. v. Collingdale State Bank, 85 F. 2d 375 (C.A. 3d, 1936);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Tulsa Industrial Loan & Investment Co., 83 F. 2d 14 (C.A. xoth,
1936); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Consolidated Nat'l Bank, 7x Fed. 116 (C.A. 3d, i895). But
cf. Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 8o F. 2d 205, 207 (C.A. 4th, 1935) (time for dis-
covery limitation clause held as negativing the intent of separate contracts). A "time for dis-
covery" clause limits recovery to those defalcations discovered within a specified period after
the termination of the bond. It is now practically settled that time for discovery limitations
begin to run from the termination of the final renewal period, unless specific provision to the
contrary is made. Danvers Savings Bank v. Nat'l Surety, i66 Fed. 671 (C.A. ist, 1909); First
Nat'l Bank v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., iio Tenn. 10, 75 S.W. 1076 (i9o3). Contra:
Ladies of Modem Maccabbees v. Illinois Surety Co., i96 Mich. 27, 163 N.W. 7 (917);
De Jernette v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 98 Ky. 558, 33 S.W. 828 (i896).
-Farmer's Co-op. Mercantile & Shipping Ass'n v. Nat'l Surety Co., 17 F. 2d 527 (D.C.
Kan., 1927); Leonard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 8o F. 2d 205 (C.A. 4th, 1935); John
Church v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 13 Ga. App. 826, 8o S.E. 1093 (1909).
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Regardless of the number of years this bond shall continue in force and the number
of premiums which shall be payable or paid, the liability of the Underwriter under
this bond shall not be cumulative in amounts from year to year or from period to
period.
The liability of the Underwriter being limited to the amounts scheduled, regardless
of the number of years this suretyship remains in force or the number of premiums
paid.
Without exception, courts dealing with noncumulative clauses have reached
the result in the Columbia Hospital case, restricting the surety company's total
liability for all periods covered by bonds and renewals to the face amount of the
bond. 2 Thus renewals do not increase total monetary liability.
This result can be fully understood only when it is remembered that fidelity
bonds generally have time for discovery limitation clauses.' 3 Thus, unless the
time for discovery is extended, employers must be more or less diligent in dis-
covering defalcations to take advantage of the coverage for losses incurred
during any one period. Renewal forms for practically every type of fidelity bond
contain such time for discovery extension provisions, usually extending the
deadline to a definite period measured after the final termination of the coverage.
The sureties argue that the renewal premiums constitute consideration spe-
cifically for these extensions. They maintain that their greatest losses result
from such "continuous" contracts, even though the coverage is limited to the
face amount of the bond.'4 They further assert that progressively increasing
premiums would be essential to support "cumulative-continuous" indemnity,
i.e., coverage up to the face amount for each period plus time for discovery ex-
tension provisions. But there is no record of this type of coverage being offered
to private employers anywhere, for any premium.
The fidelity companies explain this on the ground that the employer-obligees
are unwilling to pay the proper premiums. Nevertheless, employers have time
and again sought to have the courts construe many different kinds of fidelity
bonds as cumulative. s In spite of the consistency of the holdings construing
"2New York Casualty Co. v. Ford, i45 F. 2d 599 (C.A. 5th, z944); Hack v. American Surety
Co., 96 F. 2d 939 (C.A. 7th, 1938), cert. denied 305 U.S. 631 (1938); Brulatour v. Aetna Casual-
ty & Surety Co., So F. 2d 834 (C.A. 2d, 1936); U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Barber, 70
F. 2d 220 (C.A. 6th, 1934); Quinlan & Tyson, Inc. v. Nat'l Casualty Co., 311 Iln. App. 369,
36 N.E. 2d 470 (1941).
's See note ia supra. It makes sense to purchase a renewal certificate instead of a new bond
only if the former has such an extension of the time for discovery. One of the consequences of
omitting such a clause is well illustrated in United States v. American Surety Co., 172 F. 2d
z35 (C.A. 2d, 1949). Finding no cumulative liability limitation clause and no provision re-
garding time for discovery, the court felt free to presume that had the government taken out
fresh bonds yearly, complete coverage for each year would permanently be insured, and thus
inferred that renewals must achieve the same result. See also, Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Swedish Methodist Aid Ass'n, 92 F. 2d 649 (C.A. 7th, 1937).
14 Columbia Hospital for Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 188 F. 2d 654, 657 (App.
D.C., 195i); communication from Aetna Insurance & Casualty Co., June I8, 1951.
Is Columbia Hospital for Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 188 F. 2d 654 (App. D.C.,
195i). See cases cited note 4 supra.
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bonds and contracts containing cumulative or aggregate liability limitation
clauses, they have often maintained that they understood they were getting
separate coverage for each year even in the presence of such clauses. Employers
have construed the noncumulative clause to mean that there can be no accumula-
tion of coverage in the sense of applying unobligated amounts from one period
to the next.
This construction is, of course, reasonable, and can be challenged only on
the grounds that (i) the courts have decided uniformly against it, and (2) the
premiums paid do not offer adequate consideration for "cumulative-continuous"
coverage.
Adopting these two arguments, the Columbia Hospital court cited cases con-
struing similar noncumulative clauses as controlling. The court was especially
impressed with the fact that three such clauses 6 were included in the Superseded
Suretyship Rider 7 which was attached to the original Blanket Position Bond.
This rider cancelled, upon the issuance of that bond, the original bond and es-
tablished "continuous" liability for the periods covered by both. Notice was
also taken of the last rider which, by eliminating the word "annual" from the
instruments, gave further support to the idea of continuous coverage.
judge Clark vigorously dissented. Not only was the language ambiguous, in
his opinion, but "the far more reasonable construction is that it simply means
that the coverage on years when no loss was suffered cannot be carried over to
cover losses in a subsequent year when losses were in excess of $5,ooo." z He
maintained that the ambiguity was indicated by the difficulty which the courts
have had in interpreting the noncumulative clauses, but he cited no cases. In
conclusion, attention was drawn to the familiar rule that "wherever ambiguity
appears in a contract it must be construed most strongly against the party who
drew it and in favor of the party who did not draw it."' 9
Judge Clark's position is supported only by dicta and dissenting opinions.20
At best, some courts have been apologetic while following the traditional inter-
16 Columbia Hospital for Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., i88 F. 2d 654, 658 (App.
D.C., i95i). The key words in three clauses were as follows: (i) "liability... shall not be
cumulative in amounts.. ."; (2) "the liability... shall, in no event, exceed in the aggregate
the amount carried under the attached bond"; (3) "liability... shall not be cumulative."
x7 I.e., the clause explaining the extent of liability for the period covered by the old bond
retained under the new bond. Such riders provide for continuing liability, extending the time
for discovery. They also serve to enumerate the complicated details of coverage for the differ-
ent periods occasioned by changes in the face amount of the bond, or the type of coverage. A
cumulative liability limitation clause is found in every Superseded Suretyship Rider.
18 Columbia Hospital for Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., i88 F. 2d 654, 66i
(App. D.C., i95').
'9 Ibid.
"o Dissents and expressions of unhappiness over the situation are prevelant. E.g., Fellows, J.,
in Michigan Mortgage Investment Co. v. American Employer's Ins. Co., 244 Mich. 72, 75,
221 N.W. 140, 141 (1929); Hack v. American Surety Co., 96 F. 2d 939, 945 (C.A. 7th, 1938),
cert. denied 3o5 U.S. 361 (1938); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. State Bank, 13 F. 2d 474(E.D. Ill., 1926), rev'd on other grounds, ig F. 2d 969 (C.A. 7th, 1927).
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pretation, indicating rather meekly that they would appreciate legislative action
requiring the insurance companies to clarify the language somewhat. 2r Can it
then be maintained that the words are in any sense ambiguous?
It has been said that "there can be no ambiguity when a term has been
judicially defined."- But this blanket statement presents grave difficulty. The
language of the standard noncumulative clause is by no means clear or free
from doubt? Yet the non-expert employer-obligee, who at no time participates
in its drafting, is charged with expert knowledge of the cases construing such
clauses. He is also charged by the courts with expert knowledge of comparative
insurance premiums and rates.
Fidelity and guaranty insurance law is supposedly governed, for present
purposes, by the same principles controlling general insurance law 4 The watch-
word utilized by all the courts in the latter field has always been "Verba Char-
tarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem." 25 The sense of this doctrine is
simply that parties to insurance contracts usually deal on an unequal basis,
thus tempting the insurer to word the policy so as to attract a bevy of customers,
while subtly minimizing the risk of actual liability.
26
21 "It is true that the practical effect of such clauses in fidelity bonds,... is the creation of a
situation wherein one employer buying fidelity insurance each year in a new company re-
ceives multiple protection, whereas another who, because of satisfactory dealings with his
insurer, renews in the same company, receives but single protection for all premium periods,
though the cost to him is exactly the same. The remedy for this situation, however, lies with
the fidelity companies or with the Legislatures, and not with the courts." U.S. Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Barber, 7o F. 2d 220, 226 (C.A. 6th, 1934); Hack v. American Surety Co.,
96 F. 2d 939, 945 (C.A. 7th, 1938); Jacksonville v. Bryan, 196 N.C. 721, 723-724, 147 S.E. 12,
13 (1929).
- Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Knorr, 112 F. 2d 679, 682 (C.A.
ioth, 294o). "If a written contract is stated so that it can be given a certain definite legal
meaning, it is not ambiguous. ... " Provident Ins. Co. v. Bagby, 167 S.W. 2d 813, 814 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1941).
23 For the criteria applied by most courts in determining the existence of ambiguity, see
Arkansas Amusement Corp. v. Kempner, 57 F. 2d 466, 472 (C.A. 4th, 1932); Osterholm v.
Boston & Montana Consol. Copper & Silver Mining Co., 40 Mont. So8, 59, 107 Pac. 499, 505
(r9ro); Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Dixon, 27 Tenn. App. 312, 315, 18o S.W. 2d
426, 427 (1944); State Bank of Wilbur v. Phillips, ii Wash. 2d 483, 488, rig P. 2d 664, 666
(194r).
4 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Commercial State Bank, 13 F. 2d 474, 475 (E.D. Ill.,
1926); U.S. Fidelity Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Ill. 475, 84 N.E. 670 (1908); John Church v.
Aetna Indemnity Co., 13 Ga. App. 826, 8o S.E. 1o93 (igog). Vance, Handbook of the Law
of Insurance 920 (2d ed., 1930).
2SThe words of instruments are construed strongly against the one who drafts them. Co.
Litt. *36a. "Where, in an insurance policy, a term is open to two or more constructions we are
required to adopt the one more favorable to the insured." Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
v. Friedlander, 1o1 F. 2d io6, 107 (C.A. 6th, 1939), and cases cited therein. For a general
account of the doctrine as it applies to contracts and leases, see Broom, Legal Maxims 402-410
(ioth ed., Kersley, 1939). See Vance, op. cit. supra note 24, at 689. But cf. Frontier Mortgage
Corp. v. Heft, 146 Md. 1, 125 Atl. 772 (1924).
26 Bourgeois v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 6o6, 61o, 57 N.W. 347, 348 (1893);
De Lancey v. Rockingham Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 58i (2873). See also
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As with most stereotyped doctrines, "Verba Chartarum" has been applied
with marked inconsistency, but in many instances the courts have penalized
insurance companies by interpreting doubtful or uncertain phrases, terms ad-
mitting of varying interpretations, in such a way as to maximize the insured's
interest or claim.27 In these cases, the issue was not whether as a result of ju-
dicial precedent, the language was clear to the court. The only relevant question
was the clarity of meaning to the "reasonable," non-expert layman.28
Insurance law, however, has not had a steady development. Woodruff's
rhetorical question, "What do they know of the law of insurance who only the
law of contract know?,2 9 is in much closer accord with the facts than Justice
Crane's formula that "a contract for insurance is no different than any other
contract."3 o
Marine insurance contracts, for example, are still incomprehensible colla-
tions of misleading jargon to the average layman, despite their standardization.3'
Judicial construction and interpretation of marine insurance contracts admits
of little, if any, variation.32 These contracts, however, are almost always nego-
tiated by experts representing both parties.33 The courts therefore indulge in
a presumption of expertise which creates allowances for otherwise misleading
clauses, but which certainly should not be extended to all other kinds of in-
surance contracts.
34
Fire insurance contract forms are also largely standardized.35 Early fire in-
surance practice, in some respects, was recognized by the courts to be quite
vicious. Special attention was probably paid to the fact that most fire insurance
customers were property-owning laymen, with no expert knowledge of either
Reilly v. Linden, i5i Minn. i, z86 N.W. 121 (1921), and Patterson v. Adar, 1i9 Minn.
3o8, 138 N.W. 281 (1912) for developments in liberalizing the construction of liability insur-
ance contracts.
27 E.g., Aschenbrenner v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 292 U.S. 8o, 85 (1934); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Hiatt, 14o F. 2d 752 (C.A. 9 th, 1944); cases cited note 23 supra. See Williams v. Union Central
Co., 291 U.S. 170, 18o (1934).
's Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 16o F. 2d 599, 6oi (C.A. 2d, 1947);
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hiatt, 14o F. 2d 752, 753 (C.A. 9 th, 1944).
29 Woodruff, Selection of Cases on the Law of Insurance 5 (2d ed., 1924). See Satz v. Massa-
chusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 385, 393, 153 N.E. 844, 846 (1926).
30 Drilling v. New York Life Ins. Co., 234 N.Y. 234, 241, 137 N.E. 314, 316 (1922).
31 Vance, op. cit. supra note 24, at 18-20, 40-41. See Brough v. Whitmore, 4 T.R. 2o6
(1791). See Arnould, Marine Insurance § io (iith ed., 1924), for a copy of the standard form
of marine insurance policy employed by Lloyds of London.
32 Vance, op. cit. supra note 24 at 4o-4i. Cf. Marten v. Vestey Bros., Ltd., [192o] A.C. 307,
122 L.T.R. 785; Le Cheminant v. Pearson, 4 Taunt. 367 (1812).
33 Patterson, Essentials of Insurance Law 239 (r935).
34 Ibid.
35 Vance, op. cit. supra note 24, at 41-43; Patterson, op. cit. supra note 34, at 20-22;
Standard Fire Policy, Ill. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, I95o), c. 73, § 1009-
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the insurance business or the law.36 The most serious pitfalls were avoided by
liberal application of the "Verba Chartarum" doctrine, but others remained.37
The codes embodying the standard forms were developed with reference to the
early cases construing the terms of fire insurance policies.3s Thus, in general, fire
insurance policy terms are still construed in favor of the insured.39
It might be argued that whether separable or continuous liability of a fidelity
bond insurer is more advantageous to an employer would depend upon the cir-
cumstances of the loss. Thus, if the principles used in fire insurance standardi-
zation were applied to fidelity bonds, the same bond and its renewal would be
construed as separate in one case and continuous in another.4o Undoubtedly,
the rules of construction defining separable and continuing contracts were in-
tended to avoid this result.
The presence of the noncumulative clause in the Columbia Hospital case could
easily have been understood as providing for separate and continuous coverage.
"Cumulative" meant something entirely different to each of the contracting
parties. Neither interpretation was patently unreasonable. It would seem, then,
that to be consistent with the oft-stated judicial attitude towards insurance con-
tracts generally,4' the clause should have been construed in the manner indi-
cated by the plaintiff.
The court in this case, of course, denied that the language was ambiguous.
But, sensing the necessity for further justifying the holding, it concluded with
the following most extraordinary statement: "Perhaps such litigation as the
instant case will serve as admonition to purchasers of insurance to read their
contracts carefully and to seek expert advice with regard to the scope of the cov-
erage."42 (Emphasis added.)
36 Patterson, Insurance Commissioner in the United States 245 ff. (1927). See also De
Lancey v. Rockingham Farmers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 52 N.H. 58I (1873).
37 E.g., breaches by the insured of conditions not material to the loss may suffice to exoner-
ate the insurer from all obligations. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, r5i U.S. 452
(1894).
38 Chauvin v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 283 Pa. 397, 129 Aft. 326 (1925); John Davis & Co. v.
Ins. Co. of North America, 115 Mich. 382, 73 N.W. 393 (1897). Vance, op. cit. supra note 24,
at 689-693.
31 Vance, op. cit. supra note 24, at 691.
4' E.g., Florida Cent. & P. R.R. Co. v. American Surety Co., 99 Fed. 674 (C.A. 2d, 1900);
Proctor Coal Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 124 Fed. 424 (N.D. Ga., i9o3), wherein
the plaintiffs sought a construction of continuous coverage.
41 Insurance is "the classic example" of a "contract of adhesion," i.e., a contract not ar-
rived at by mutual negotiation and drafting. See Thompson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 136 U.S.
287, 297 (189o); Schultz, Special Nature of the Insurance Contract, 15 Law & Contemp. Prob.
376, 379 (195o); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. i98, 222
(I919). Vance pointed out that even businessmen rarely read their insurance policies. Vance,
op. cit. supra note 24, at 215.
42 Columbia Hospital for Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 188 F. 2d 654, 659 (App.
D.C., 1951). The court further refused to order a return of any of the later premiums. This had
been done in a few cases on the grounds that the premiums were paid under the misapprehen-
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With few exceptions, such as the marine insurance cases, this advice is prac-
tically unprecedented in insurance law. Yet it cannot be said to represent a shift
in judicial sentiment, in view of several very recent cases re-affirming the more
traditional doctrine favoring the insured.43 The classical opinion still is that
the primary responsibility is on the insurer to spell out as clearly as he can the
terms of the indemnity. It must be noted, however, that while lip service is paid
to this doctrine, real progress along these lines has always been slow and
tortuous.4 4
Assuming that employers are to some extent misled into believing that they
receive cumulative-continuous coverage, there is good reason to ask why the
fidelity companies do not attempt to clarify their language. Such a task would
not be difficult. It would reduce litigation, misunderstanding and ill will. The
changes thus far made in these clauses, while helpful, are inadequate.45 Since
most companies act in good faith, with no desire to "trap" inexpert customers,
there is no obvious reason why a comprehensive effort should not be made.
However, several important considerations should be noted.
The surety companies are limited in their freedom to modify their contract
forms by a supervening voluntary organization, the Surety Association of
America. A committee of this Association standardizes the bonds and contracts
as much as possible; substantial changes in the forms used by member companies
must be ratified by the committee.46 Although the workings of the Association
are somewhat esoteric, a certain amount of inertia in obtaining results from
concerted group action of this type can be understood and appreciated. There
can be no doubt, however, that the companies are aware of the problem. Perhaps
sion that they were "acquiring" new coverage. Hack v. American Surety Co., 96 F. 2d 939
(C.A. 7th, 1938), cert. denied 3o5 U.S. 631 (i938). The analogy to the contract notion of rescis-
sion here is quite strong, but was in effect denied by the court's finding that there was no "am-
biguity" in the terms of the bond sufficient to support a rescission. Columbia Hospital for
Women v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., i88 F. 2d 654, 657 (App. D.C., 195I).
It has been suggested further that insurance should be regarded as "affected with a public
interest." Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
Col. L. Rev. 629, 635 (1943). See also Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1899); Citizens'
Ins. Co. v. Clay, 197 Fed. 435 (E.D. Ky., 1912), aff'd 235 U.S. 711 (1913).
43 Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 16o F. 2d 599 (C.A. 2d, 1947); New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Hiatt, 14o F. 2d 752 (C.A. 9th, 1944); Kellogg v. Iowa State Traveling Men's
Ass'n, 239 Iowa 196, 29 N.W. 559 (1947).
44 E.g., the first standard fire insurance policy form was adopted in Massachusetts in 1873.
Mass. Stat. (i86o) c. 331 (2 Supp., 1873). Pronouncements of unconstitutionality, incessant
revisions and much wrangling prevented final adoption of such forms in many states for another
fifty years. Today many are still dissatisfied. Consult Vance, op. cit. supra note 24, at 41-43.
4s The court in the Columbia Hospital case noted the addition of the words "from year to
year" in the cumulative liability limitation clause as a "concession to the need for specificity."
Columbia Hospital v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 188 F. 2d 654, 657 (App. D.C., 951).
But, considering the claims of the plaintiff in this case, the addition of these words appears
more to contribute to the confusion, than to constitute an improvement.
46 Communication from Aetna Insurance & Casualty Co., June i8, x95i.
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the continually favorable results of litigation on the point have eased what
otherwise would be incentive to change.
Possible mistrust in the good faith of the complainants in pressing their
claims poses a more plausible reason for this inertia. Strong suspicions under-
standably arise in the minds of the sureties when, after incessant clamoring for
lower rates and premiums, employers, upon loss, seek to establish coverage
which would be justified only by much larger premiums. Such a view, however,
loses much of its force when it is realized that, by and large, the employers have
no notion as to what is a proper premium rate.
The inertia of the companies in this matter, as in most fields of insurance, is
then hard to justify or explain. Although it is absurd to charge most of the com-
panies with bad faith, it is apparent that the only satisfactory solution is for
the courts consistently to apply the "Verba Chartarum" doctrine here, and to
find clauses ambiguous, in spite of prior constructions to the contrary.
By the insurance companies' own admission, the courts' tendency to find
ambiguities in insurance and fidelity contracts raises the level of the contingent
reserves which must be kept frozen to meet unanticipated claims.47 It is sub-
mitted that the continued use of such language as that found in the typical
noncumulative clause, court interpretation to the contrary, is deserving of such
cold treatment.
47 SchultZ, op. cit. supra note 4r, at 390.
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